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ARGUMENT
POINT I. APPELLANT IS CHALLENGING THE
FACTUAL FINDING OF THE DISTRICT COURT THAT
APPELLANT ATTEMPTED TO FLEE.
The Brief of Appellee partially misstates the position of
Appellant when it states at page 9:
Defendant has not challenged the factual
findings of the trial court, but has
challenged the legal conclusions drawn from
those findings.
Consequently, this Court
reviews the matter under the correction of
error.
However,

appellant

is

challenging

the

district

finding that the appellant attempted to flee.

court!s

The Brief of

Appellant quoted the transcript at considerable length (p.p. 2 028) , to establish that the appellant had not attempted to flee
nor had the officers ever claimed that he had.

The officers

detained and searched him because they had orders to detain and
search all persons heading toward the homes being searched.
Brief of Appellant argued at page 29:
The district court's conclusion that
appellant attempted to flee and this raised a
suspicion in the officer's mind that led to
further detention and the searches is clearly
erroneous
in view of the officer's
testimony.9
In footnote 9, the appellant recognized that the standard of

The

review for such a "factual assessment underlying a decision to
grant . . .a motion to suppress" is "clear error".

Appellant

agrees with respondent that the standard of review applicable to
all the rest of appellant's arguments is the correction of error
standard.
POINT II. THE APPELLANT DID NOT WAIVE
CHALLENGE TO THE SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE.
The
appellant

Brief
waived

of

Respondent

his

at

challenge

p.p.

to

19

the

-

A

2 0 argues that

search

of his truck

because, in respondent's view, appellant did not provide any
legal analysis of a challenge to the search of his vehicle.
However, respondent misconstrues appellant's argument.
In Point II of the Brief of Appellant, the appellant, for
purposes of that argument, assumed the legality of the initial
stop

(which

he

had

challenged

in

Point

I) , and

argued

at

considerable length, citing authority, that the further detention
and the search of his person and his truck were invalid.
The appellant analyzed the search of the defendant and his
truck together because the district court had done so (Conclusion
3, R-22, quoted
appellant

sees

Brief
no

of Appellant

legal

distinction

defendant's person and his truck.

at

p.

between

20) and
the

because

search of'

The searches of appellant's!

person and truck occurred simultaneously and were analytically a
2

single search, the search of the truck for weapons being merely
the extension of the "pat down" of appellant's person.

The

justification claimed by the state and the district court for the
search of the truck and appellant's person was the same, that is,
that the search of both appellant and his truck was necessary to
determine if appellant was armed to protect the safety of the
officers while appellant was being detained.
Appellant attacked this justification on the grounds that
the evidence did not support a reasonable suspicion of wrong
doing by the appellant to justify the detention or a reasonable
concern

that

appellant

was armed to justify

weapons as the case law requires.
- 34) .

the search

for

(Brief of Appellant at p.p. 20

In the absence of any claim by the state that there was

some additional justification for the search of the truck, there
is simply no need to separately analyze the search of the truck
from the search of appellant's person.
POINT III UNITED STATES V. RIVERA CITED BY
THE RESPONDENT CAN BE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE
INSTANT CASE.
The Brief of Respondent relies heavily on United States v.
Rivera, 738 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
13 - 16.

Brief of Appellee at

Rivera, like Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)

and State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986), discussed in Brief
3

of Appellant at p. 33, involved the detention and search of a
resident occupant who was attempting to enter premises being
searched.
It must be remembered that in this case the officers were
stopping all persons entering the street where there were six to
eight homes (Motion to Suppress Transcript, p. 7) and searching
for weapons all persons, including their vehicles, who were
headed toward any of the those homes being searched.

Certainly,

the federal district court in Rivera did not overrule the holding
of the United States Supreme Court in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S.

85, 92

(1979), that a visitor within a premises being

searched under a warrant for drugs cannot be searched for weapons
simply because he is visiting a premises where drug trafficking
is occurring.

If a visitor inside the premises being searched

cannot be searched for weapons, a fortiori a visitor approaching
the premises cannot be searched.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

/f^A day of October, 1990.

JQflN D. O'CONNELL
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing Reply
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Brief were served upon R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney, 23 6 Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, by placing same in the United States
Mail on this

/ff-/^ day of October, 1990.
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